RAF

Facts: The applicant sought an interim payment for past hospital and medical expenses under section 17(6) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, read with Rule 34A of the Uniform Rules of Court. The claim arose from a motor vehicle accident on 5 September 2021, where the applicant sustained severe injuries, including a brain injury, multiple fractures, and psychological sequelae. The respondent, the Road Accident Fund (RAF), admitted negligence on the part of the insured driver in a settlement offer dated 7 October 2022, but explicitly reserved its rights regarding other aspects of the claim, including causation, injuries, and damages.

Issue: The primary issue was whether the respondent’s admission of negligence constituted a written admission of liability under Rule 34A(4)(a), thereby entitling the applicant to an interim payment for past medical expenses.

Discussion: The applicant provided a schedule of past medical expenses totalling R988,183.14 and requested an interim payment. The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the admission of negligence did not equate to an admission of liability for damages. It was examined whether the respondent’s settlement offer, which admitted negligence but reserved rights on other aspects of the claim, satisfied the requirements of Rule 34A(4)(a). Case law was referred to, including Alexander v Road Accident Fund [2023] ZAGPJHC 112 and Qelesile v Road Accident Fund [2023] ZAGPJHC 221, which held that an admission of negligence alone is insufficient for an interim payment under Rule 34A. The rule requires a clear, unequivocal admission of liability for damages, encompassing all elements of delict, including causation and harm. The respondent’s plea and answering affidavit further confirmed that liability for damages was disputed, as the respondent denied causation, injuries, and the amount claimed.

Findings: Section 17(6) of the RAF Act allows for interim payments but ties such payments to compensation awarded under section 17(1), which requires proof of causation and harm. The respondent’s admission of negligence did not amount to an admission of liability for damages, as required by Rule 34A(4)(a). The respondent had explicitly reserved its rights regarding other aspects of the claim, including causation and damages. The applicant had not met the jurisdictional requirements for an interim payment, as there was no written admission of liability or a judgment confirming liability. Consequently, the application for an interim payment was dismissed.

Order: The application for an interim payment of R989,448.84 was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application.

Facts: The first and second respondent instituted separate claims against the RAF arising out of motor vehicle accidents in separate incidents. A few days before the dates of the hearing of both claims, the respondents and the RAF settled the claims. The High Court refused to make the settlement agreements orders of the court. The late settlement of the claims prompted the Judge President to constitute a full court to inquire into the reasons for the delay and late settlement of the claims. In pursuance of its decision to conduct the inquiry, the full court issued various directives, which were primarily aimed at the officials of the RAF. The full court ordered costs de bonis propriis against the CEO of the Road Accident Fund and the Road Accident Fund Board.

Appeal: These issues are dispositive of this appeal: (a) whether it was appropriate for the Judge President to refer the first and second respondents claims to the full court for an inquiry; if so, whether a case has been made for the orders granted; (b) the non-joinder of the Board to the proceedings; (c) whether costs should have been granted against the CEO and the Board, in the light of section 15(3) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the RAF Act).

Discussion: It was within the prerogative of the Judge President, acting in terms of section 14(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 to constitute a full court. The High Court was entitled, in terms of its practice directives, the empowering Rule 37A(13), as well as the wide discretion it has in the award of costs, to hold this inquiry when the two cases were brought before it for the purpose of making the settlement agreements orders of court. It was thus competent and proper for it to refer the two cases to the full court to inquire into the question of wasted costs. The full court found that there was a causal connection between the demand to remove the files from the RAF panel attorneys and the delay in the late settlement of the claims. It is settled law that those who occupy public office and who act in a representative capacity may be mulcted with costs out of their own pockets in certain circumstances. The full court found that the system which was implemented by the RAF after the disposal of the panel attorneys and the challenges thereof appears to be the real problem for the “failure by the Fund to participate effectively in the pre-trial procedures and failure to attend court on the dates of the trial”.

Section 15(3) of the RAF Act: The CEO, the Board and any of its members enjoy indemnity in terms of section 15(3) of the RAF Act when acting in good faith. Section 15(3) envisages that the functionaries who act in bad faith in the exercise of their powers or the performance of their functions or duties towards the RAF should be mulct with costs. There was no evidence before the full court to arrive at the finding of bad faith by the appellants, either based on malicious intent or even “gross recklessness that reveals a breakdown of the ordinary exercise of authority”. This finding is dispositive of the issue relating to the CEO and the Board’s liability. However, as to the costs of the inquiry, it is in the interests of justice that the RAF be held liable for the costs as the first and second respondents were not responsible in any way. The RAF failed to validate the claims as required by section 24(5) of the RAF Act. It also failed to attend the Rule 37 and judicial case management hearings which ultimately caused the High Court to hold the inquiry into costs. It was to blame for the holding of the inquiry. The case management procedures including hearings relating to costs, necessarily form part and parcel of litigation.

Order: The appeal regarding the RAF is dismissed. The appeal is upheld in respect of the CEO and the RAF Board. The RAF shall pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the appeal, including the costs of two counsel, where so employed. The order of the High Court is set aside and replaced by the following order: “The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of suit, including the costs of the inquiry and of two counsel in the inquiry, where so employed.”

MOLITSOANE AJA (MOCUMIE JA, HUGHES JA, SMITH JA and DOLAMO AJA concurring)

Facts: The plaintiff, Mashabela, a member of the South African Police Service, was involved in a motor vehicle collision on 25 January 2019 in Protea Glen, Soweto. She lodged a claim with the Road Accident Fund (RAF), but the RAF failed to investigate or engage in settlement discussions within the 120-day moratorium period provided by the RAF Act. The plaintiff issued a summons on 8 October 2020, and the RAF failed to file a Notice of Intention to Defend within the required 10 days. The matter proceeded to default judgment hearings, during which the RAF attempted to file a Notice of Intention to Defend at the last minute, seeking a postponement. The plaintiff argued that the RAF’s conduct was an abuse of the court process.

Application: The plaintiff applied for default judgment against the RAF, seeking a declaration that the RAF was 100% liable for her damages arising from the collision. She also sought a punitive cost order against the RAF for its late filing of the Notice of Intention to Defend and its general conduct in delaying the litigation. The main issue was whether the RAF's late filing of the Notice of Intention to Defend and its conduct in delaying the litigation warranted a punitive cost order. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the RAF was liable for the plaintiff's damages and whether the matter should be postponed due to the late filing of the Notice of Intention to Defend.

Discussion: The RAF has a habitual practice of delaying litigation by filing Notices of Intention to Defend at the last minute, often years after the required period, and then seeking postponements. The affidavits filed by persons employed at the defendants’ offices were unhelpful. The documents do not talk to the delay but merely serves to obfuscate and avoid personal blame of the respective authors. No cogent explanation is put up for why the defendant did not defend the matter for four years or what steps were taken to properly investigate the matter, secure witnesses or make an offer of settlement at an early stage, if so advised. This practice was an abuse of the court process and placed an unnecessary burden on judicial resources. The provisions of Uniform Rule 19(5) allow for the late filing of a Notice of Intention to Defend but do not automatically entitle the defendant to a postponement. The Rules of Court should not be used to unduly delay litigation or force settlements.

Findings: The RAF was 100% liable for the plaintiff's damages, as the plaintiff's version of events was uncontested. The defendant did not plead a defence but contented for either contributory negligence or complete negligence of the plaintiff. This was not borne out of the evidence. The RAF's conduct in delaying the litigation and filing the Notice of Intention to Defend at the last minute was an abuse of the court process. However, the granting of a punitive cost order was refused, as the RAF's conduct, while problematic, did not rise to the level of mala fides required for such an order. The cost order envisaged in Rule 19(5) is not the fee for a postponement to the "trial roll". It is merely a backstop to protecting a right of access to court. Allowing it to become the penalty then withdraws a judicial discretion in respect of a matter seized before the court.

Order: The RAF was declared 100% liable for the plaintiff's proved or agreed damages arising from the collision. The determination of the quantum of damages was postponed. The RAF was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of the hearing, as well as the costs of preparing the plaintiff's heads of argument, on Scale B.

KHAN AJ

Facts: The appellant appealed against the dismissal of his claim by the court a quo, which found him solely responsible for a motorcycle accident that occurred on 29 January 2017. The appellant alleged that an unidentified white VW Golf, carrying four occupants, collided with his motorcycle, causing him to lose control and crash into a concrete barrier. He claimed that the occupants of the vehicle pointed a firearm at him and gestured for him to pull over, but he accelerated to escape. The appellant was hospitalized for several months following the accident. The respondent, the Road Accident Fund, disputed the appellant’s version, arguing that he lost control of his motorcycle without any collision with another vehicle. The appellant did not report the accident to the police immediately, and the accident report, compiled by a retired police officer, Mr. Moshupa, indicated that the appellant had collided with a barrier.

Issue: The central issue was whether the appellant’s version of events, that an unidentified vehicle collided with his motorcycle, causing the accident, was more probable than the respondent’s contention that the appellant lost control of his motorcycle and crashed into a barrier without any involvement of another vehicle.

Discussion: The appellant challenged the accuracy of the accident report, citing discrepancies in his name, identity number, and motorcycle details. The appellant’s account of seeing the vehicle’s occupants, their gestures, and the alleged collision in a dark area at night was improbable. It was unlikely that the appellant could have seen such details clearly under the described conditions. Additionally, the plausibility of the appellant’s claim that the occupants acted “gently” despite being aggressive and armed was questionable. There were discrepancies in the appellant’s testimony regarding the duration of his hospitalization and his failure to report the accident to the police immediately. The accident report, authored by Mr. Moshupa, supported the respondent’s version that the appellant had collided with a barrier.

Findings: Mr. Moshupa’s evidence was credible and consistent, despite minor discrepancies in the report. The appellant’s failure to provide hospital records to clarify the timeline further weakened his case. The appellant had not discharged the onus of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that another vehicle caused the accident. The appellant’s version was deemed improbable, and it was accepted that he had lost control of his motorcycle and collided with the barrier without any involvement of another vehicle. Consequently, the appellant was found solely responsible for the accident and not entitled to claim compensation from the respondent.

Order: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs, including the costs of counsel, on Scale C.

Facts: The Road Accident Fund (RAF) applied for the suspension of writs of execution and warrants of attachment against it, seeking to extend a moratorium on payments for capital claims, interest claims, and legal costs claims. The moratorium, initially granted in November 2020, had been extended multiple times to stabilize the RAF’s financial position.

Issue: The central issue was whether the court should grant the RAF’s application to suspend writs of execution and warrants of attachment for capital, interest, and legal costs claims, and if so, under what conditions. The court also had to determine the appropriate commencement dates for the suspension periods and whether the order should operate for six or twelve months.

Discussion: The RAF sought to suspend execution for 180 days for capital claims, with the suspension period starting from the date the RAF was informed of the court order or settlement. For interest claims, the suspension would start from the date the capital claim was paid, and for legal costs, the suspension would depend on whether the bill of costs was settled internally or taxed. The respondents, including legal associations and attorneys, argued that the RAF’s proposed conditions were overly burdensome and unreasonable. Some respondents also sought structural interdicts to compel the RAF to pay outstanding claims.

Findings: The moratorium had been in place since 2020 to allow the RAF to manage its financial obligations. However, the RAF’s proposed conditions, such as requiring claimants to “alert” the RAF to court orders and provide stamped copies, were deemed overly burdensome. The suspension of execution for capital and interest claims was necessary to prevent the RAF’s collapse, but the conditions imposed by the RAF were unreasonable. Regarding the suspension of legal costs claims, the RAF’s financial difficulties were acknowledged but it was argued that a six-week suspension was more reasonable than the RAF’s proposed six-month suspension. The RAF’s challenges required legislative or regulatory solutions, not judicial intervention. The suspension of writs and warrants for capital and interest claims was justified, but the RAF’s proposed conditions were unreasonable.

Order: The court will make an order that all writs and warrants against the Fund in respect of capital based on orders already granted or settlements already reached, which are not older than 180 calendar days as from the date when the Fund is informed thereof by the sending of an e-mail to 4[...] together with a copy of the stamped court order, and a copy of the settlement agreement where applicable, are suspended for a period of 180 calendar days from the date when the court order is sent to the Fund’s dedicated e-mail address, together with where applicable, a copy of the settlement agreement. An e-mail delivery report shall constitute rebuttable proof of delivery and hence rebuttable proof that the obligation to inform the Fund has been discharged. In the event of the dedicated e-mail address not accepting e-mails on three consecutive calendar days, delivery by hand to the RAF’s head office will discharge the claimant’s attorney’s obligation to inform the Fund.

Facts: The plaintiff, Maduse, claimed damages from the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision on 4 May 2015. While riding his bicycle along Malibongwe Road in Randburg, he was struck from behind by a truck that did not stop, leaving him with a fractured left arm. The plaintiff lodged a claim directly with the RAF in 2017, but the claim was later rejected due to alleged non-compliance with documentation requirements. The plaintiff subsequently sued the RAF for R1,919,306. The defendant raised a special plea of prescription, arguing that the claim had lapsed due to the plaintiff’s failure to submit required documents, including hospital records and doctor’s particulars. The plaintiff countered that the RAF 1 form and accompanying medical records provided sufficient information, and that the defendant’s rejection of the claim was unjustified.

Issue: The key issue was whether the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAF Act), particularly in proving that the collision resulted from the negligence of an unidentified driver, and whether the claim had prescribed due to non-compliance with documentation requirements. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for riding his bicycle on a road allegedly classified as a freeway and for not wearing a helmet.

Discussion: The plaintiff’s testimony detailed the accident and his injuries. The plaintiff argued that the RAF 1 form and medical records substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and that the defendant’s rejection of the claim was improper. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s failure to provide specific documents, such as hospital records and doctor’s particulars, rendered the claim non-compliant and subject to prescription. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for riding on a freeway and not wearing a helmet. The plaintiff’s testimony was credible and consistent, despite minor discrepancies such as forgetting the name of the person who assisted him after the accident. There was no evidence to support the defendant’s claim that Malibongwe Road was a freeway or that the plaintiff’s lack of a helmet contributed to his injuries.

Findings: The plaintiff had substantially complied with the RAF Act’s requirements by submitting the RAF 1 form and medical records, which provided sufficient information about the accident and injuries. The special plea of prescription was dismissed, as the defendant’s rejection of the claim was not justified. The defendant’s argument of contributory negligence was also rejected, finding no evidence that the plaintiff’s actions contributed to the accident or his injuries. The plaintiff had proven his case on a balance of probabilities and the defendant was liable for 100% of the proven damages.

Order: The defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiff for 100% of the proven damages. The defendant was also ordered to bear the costs of the trial.

Pre-accident scenario: The plaintiff is the father and natural guardian of a minor child who was 10 years old at the time of the accident. The child was a Grade 4 student and lived with his parents. Prior to the accident, the minor child was performing well academically, with marks ranging between 70% and 90% in earlier grades, although there was a slight decline in performance in Grade 3 and Grade 4.

Accident and injuries: On 29 September 2017, the minor child was a passenger in a motor vehicle that overturned after the insured driver lost control. The accident occurred between Kestrel and Flamingo Streets, Mackenzie Park, Benoni. The child sustained multiple severe injuries, including a mild traumatic brain injury, loss of lower teeth, facial disfigurement, fractures to the nose and mandible, and soft tissue injuries to various parts of the body. He was hospitalized and required extensive medical treatment.

Post-Accident scenario: Following the accident, the minor child experienced significant cognitive and physical impairments. He struggled with memory, comprehension, and concentration, leading to a decline in academic performance. Experts concluded that he would not be able to complete Grade 12 and recommended placement in a special needs school. The child also suffers from chronic pain, post-concussion headaches, and emotional distress due to facial disfigurement. His future employment prospects are severely limited, with experts suggesting he may only be suited for supported or sheltered employment.

Discussion: The expert reports detailed the minor child’s pre- and post-accident potential. Notably, the industrial psychologist did not make a provision for a possibility of the minor child being self-employed. All the postulations were based on potential for employment in the formal sector. There was no postulation on the possibility that once he is equipped with knowledge and practical skills by the TVET college, it is likely that he may establish his own business once he qualifies for a specific trade. That information is important for the court to take account of in determining a just fair compensation. The effect thereof will be that this possibility would influence the contingency that the court will have to apply. The defendant did not appoint experts or dispute the plaintiff’s evidence, leading the court to accept the plaintiff’s uncontested expert reports.

Findings: Even though the minor child’s performance declined after the accident, he has never failed any grade before and after the accident. The accident significantly impacted the minor child’s earning capacity. Applying a 25% contingency deduction to pre-morbid earnings and a 30% deduction to post-morbid earnings, R5,167,506.30 was awarded for loss of earning capacity. Additionally, R1,192,248.17 was awarded for past medical expenses, bringing the total compensation to R7,659,754.47, including the previously agreed R1,300,000 for general damages.

Order: The defendant was ordered to pay the total amount of R7,659,754.47, which includes general damages, loss of earning capacity, and past medical expenses. The funds are to be held in trust for the minor child, and a trust must be established within six months to manage the funds. The defendant is also required to provide an undertaking for future medical expenses. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, including fees for experts and legal representation.

Facts: The plaintiff, Madlala, instituted a claim against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for damages arising from bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident in 2016. The plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred due to the negligent driving of an unidentified motor vehicle, which encroached into his lane, causing him to swerve and collide with a tree. The RAF disputed the claim, and despite filing a plea, did not appear in court to tender evidence. The plaintiff relied solely on his oral testimony, stating that he lost control of his vehicle after avoiding the unidentified vehicle, leading to the collision with the tree.

Issue: The central issue was whether the plaintiff had discharged the onus of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the unidentified motor vehicle was negligently driven and that such negligence caused his injuries, as required under section 17(1)(b) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.

Discussion: Claims involving unidentified vehicles require careful scrutiny due to the heightened risk of fraud. The plaintiff’s testimony lacked corroboration, and the accident report indicated only one vehicle was involved, with no evidence of another vehicle. On the plaintiff’s own version, the danger to have been averted was a head on collision with the alleged oncoming unidentified motor vehicle. In that imminent danger, the plaintiff acquitted himself with distinction to avoid the danger. Having successfully done so, that marks the end of the imminent danger situation. What then presented itself thereafter is another danger of a collision between the plaintiff’s motor vehicle and the tree lying stationery few meters away from the shoulder of the unnamed road. Before such a collision happened, on the plaintiffs own version, he lost control of his own vehicle. Unfortunately, in this second imminent danger, the plaintiff failed to acquit himself with distinction.

Findings: The plaintiff’s version was uncorroborated and raised questions about the causal link between the alleged negligence of the unidentified driver and the collision with the tree. The plaintiff’s loss of control of his vehicle could indicate his own negligence, particularly as he provided no evidence of the steps he took to avoid the tree after successfully avoiding the unidentified vehicle. The plaintiff failed to prove that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the unidentified driver. The evidence did not establish a causal link between the alleged encroachment of the unidentified vehicle and the collision with the tree. The plaintiff’s injuries were likely caused by his own negligence in losing control of his vehicle, and therefore, the RAF was not liable.

Order: The court ordered that the RAF be absolved from the instance, meaning the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

Facts: The case involves Thobeka, acting as curator ad litem for the minor, M, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 22 January 2017. M, then aged 10, suffered severe injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, a fractured femur, and psychological trauma, after losing both parents and a sibling in the accident. The Road Accident Fund (RAF) conceded 100% liability, and the issue of general damages was postponed pending further determination. The plaintiff submitted eight expert reports, with three accepted by the defendant, and sought to amend the claim amount based on an updated actuarial report.

Issue: The primary issue was determining the appropriate compensation for M’s future loss of earnings, considering her severe physical, cognitive, and psychological impairments, as well as the applicable contingency deductions.

Discussion: The expert testimony highlighted M’s reduced academic and career prospects due to her injuries. While the plaintiff’s experts projected limited employment opportunities and career stagnation, the defendant argued that M could still work in medium-strength or sedentary roles and that her resilience, evidenced by her matriculation with a Bachelor’s pass, contradicted overly pessimistic projections. The testimony provided by all the plaintiff’s experts collectively demonstrated that M’s injuries have permanently altered her academic, professional, and financial future. It is undisputed that M’s cognitive, psychological, and physical impairments have significantly reduced her future career prospects and earning potential. She suffers from major depression and experiences physical pain, further limiting her ability to compete in the open labour market.

Findings: There were inconsistencies in the expert opinions. Whereas Ms. Hako contends that M would have progressed to a professional career with an NQF 7 qualification and is now limited to a Nated Certificate, the Educational Psychologist, Mr. Kubheka, acknowledges that M achieved a Bachelor’s pass in Grade 12, despite her injuries. This contradicts the assumption of severe academic decline and stagnation. M’s injuries had permanently impaired her earning capacity. The plaintiff’s overly deterministic claim of inevitable unemployment was rejected. Applying a 27% pre-morbid contingency and a 45% post-morbid contingency, the actuarial calculations were adjusted. The final award for future loss of earnings was set at R7,700,000, reflecting M’s significant future loss while accounting for the uncertainties in her employment prospects.

Order: The defendant was ordered to pay R7,700,000 for future loss of earnings. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including expert witness fees and counsel’s fees. Interest on the capital amount was to be calculated from 14 days after the court order until payment. The plaintiff’s Rule 28 amendment to the claim amount was allowed.

Facts: The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured in an accident on 25 October 2021. Liability was resolved with the defendant, the Road Accident Fund (RAF), accepting 80% responsibility for the plaintiff’s proven damages. The plaintiff claimed R1,300 for past loss of income and R2,964,100 for future loss of income, based on actuarial calculations. The plaintiff, a foreign national, suffered severe injuries, including a brain injury, a fractured skull, and other abrasions. He was employed as a general worker in South Africa and had applied for a visa, but his long-term residency status was uncertain. The plaintiff’s employment prospects, visa status, and the physical demands of his job were considered in assessing his claim.

Issue: The primary issue was determining the appropriate compensation for the plaintiff’s past and future loss of income, considering his status as a foreign national, the uncertainties surrounding his visa, and the nature of his employment.

Discussion: The plaintiff’s claim for future loss of income required evidence of his ability to remain in South Africa and secure work. While the plaintiff provided substantial documentation, including asylum seeker permits and a visa application, there was no guarantee he could remain in the country indefinitely. The plaintiff’s current income included overtime and bonuses, which are discretionary and should not be projected into the future without applying higher contingencies. Additionally, the physically demanding nature of his work and the availability of younger workers posed risks to his long-term employment prospects.

Findings: The work that the plaintiff engaged is physically demanding work, he might not be able to continue doing the same kind of general labouring work. There was no guarantee that plaintiff would have been able to either secure or maintain employment as a general labourer until his projected retirement age. It was found that a 50% contingency deduction was appropriate to account for the uncertainties in the plaintiff’s visa status, employment stability, and the discretionary nature of overtime and bonuses. After applying this deduction, the plaintiff’s claim for past loss of income was awarded at R1,300, and his claim for future loss of income was reduced to R1,496,450. After apportioning for negligence, the total award amounted to R1,198,200.

Order: The plaintiff’s application to tender evidence via affidavit was granted. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff R1,198,200 for loss of income. The claim for general damages was postponed indefinitely. The defendant was required to provide an undertaking for 80% of the plaintiff’s future medical expenses related to the accident.

Facts: The plaintiff, Senwamadi, filed a claim against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for damages exceeding R5,3 million, alleging he was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 6 March 2021 on Houtkop Road, Vereeniging. He claimed that an unidentified vehicle driven by an unknown driver caused him to lose control of his vehicle, which overturned after hitting a pothole. The plaintiff sustained injuries, including a left scapula fracture and general body pains. He alleged he was self-employed, earning R12,000 per month at the time of the accident. The plaintiff was the sole witness, and the accident report he submitted as evidence appeared to be inconsistent and possibly fabricated.

Issue: The central issue was whether the plaintiff’s claim was valid, given the contradictions in his evidence, the questionable authenticity of the accident report, and the lack of corroborating evidence to prove the occurrence of the accident.

Discussion: The plaintiff’s testimony and the accident report were examined, which was crucial to proving the claim. The report lacked essential details, such as a case number, police officer identification, and official registration, raising suspicions of fabrication. The plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with his earlier statements and the accident report, particularly regarding the number of vehicles involved and the sequence of events. The plaintiff’s evidence was unreliable, and the accident report was likely fabricated. The defendant, RAF, denied the occurrence of the accident but provided no evidence to counter the plaintiff’s claims.

Findings: The plaintiff’s testimony was found to have been unconvincing, and it was determined that the accident report was probably fabricated. The inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s statements and the lack of credible evidence led to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove the occurrence of the accident. Concern was expressed over the potential fabrication of the accident report, and it was deemed necessary to bring the matter to the attention of relevant authorities.

Order: The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with costs. Additionally, the registrar was directed to send copies of the judgment to the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Police, and the CEO of the Road Accident Fund for further investigation into the probable fabrication of the accident report.

Facts: The plaintiff, acting on behalf of Motlhale, claimed damages from the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident in Kagiso, Krugersdorp. The plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred when a white bakkie driven by Makwala collided with Motlhale, who was a pedestrian. The plaintiff’s case relied on the testimony of a single witness, Ms Moswetsi, who claimed to have witnessed the accident. She testified that the bakkie failed to stop at a stop sign, hit Motlhale, and drove off. The defendant, RAF, disputed this version, calling two witnesses who testified that Motlhale was injured in a fight at a shebeen and struck by bricks, not a vehicle. The defendant’s witnesses included Mr. Mothopeng, who was with Motlhale at the time, and Mr. Makwala, the driver of the bakkie, who denied any collision.

Issue: The core issue was whether the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a motor vehicle accident due to the negligence of the insured driver, or whether they resulted from an unrelated assault. The credibility of the single witness, Ms Moswetsi, was pivotal to the plaintiff’s case. The court had to determine which version of events was more credible and whether the plaintiff had discharged the onus of proving negligence on the part of the insured driver.

Discussion: Ms Moswetsi’s testimony contained inconsistencies, such as her description of the vehicle and the location of the collision. She also admitted to not having a driver’s license, which cast doubt on her ability to estimate the speed of the vehicle. In contrast, the defendant’s witnesses, particularly Mr. Makwala, provided consistent and credible testimony, supported by a police statement, that no collision occurred. Mr. Mothopeng’s evidence, though inconsistent with some of his prior statements, corroborated the defendant’s version that Motlhale was injured in a fight. The plaintiff failed to call additional witnesses or present corroborative evidence, such as hospital records or police testimony, to support the claim of a motor vehicle accident.

Findings: Ms Moswetsi’s testimony was unreliable due to inconsistencies and improbabilities. Her inability to accurately describe key details of the accident, coupled with the lack of corroborative evidence, weakened the plaintiff’s case. Conversely, the defendant’s witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts, supported by documentary evidence. The plaintiff had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the injuries were caused by a motor vehicle accident or that the insured driver was negligent.

Order: The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with costs, ruling that the plaintiff had not met the burden of proof required to establish liability on the part of the RAF.