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ACTUARIAL CASE LAW REVIEW

Issue 149 – Monday 10 February 2024

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ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Expert reports – Discretion of court – Disregarding expert evidence – Appellant required time to heal before getting back to pre-accident physical abilities – Provided actuarial calculations by way of expert report – Court misdirected itself in abjuring expert reports placed before it – Refused to make award for loss of income – Reports made it plain that appellant had suffered injuries that required various interventions – Appeal succeeds – Loss of income R557,165.80.

Facts: The appellant sued out a summons to recover damages she had sustained following a motor vehicle accident on 14 June 2018. At the time, the appellant was 51 years and working as a casual cleaner while also selling cooked food on the road-side as her main means of generating income. Evidence accepted by the trial court indicates that the appellant was a pedestrian when an unknown vehicle collided with her. Following evidence, the court found that the respondent was liable for 100% for the appellant’s proved or agreed damages. However, the court refused to award damages in respect of loss of earnings on the following grounds: (a) The appellant will able to work until the retirement age 65; (b) She did not sustain any fracture or dislocation; (c) There is no medical proof or diagnosis of the appellant’s complaints about pain; and (d) The injury sustained was not serious, hence she was discharged on the same day.


Appeal: This is an appeal against the order granted by this court on 21 September 2022, sitting as court of first instance. The sole issue before the court is whether the court a quo was correct in its refusal to award damages in respect of the appellant’s loss of earning and an undertaking to cater for the appellant’s future treatment as recommended by the experts. The appeal is with leave of the court a quo. The defendant took no part in the proceedings in the court a quo.


Discussion: The appellant contended that the court a quo misdirected itself in disregarding the expert evidence placed before it. Dr Marin recorded that the appellant had sustained soft tissue injuries of the lumber spine and injury to her right knee, which resulted in residual pain. Dr Marin recommended future intervention by way of physio, biokinetics, medication and occasional visits to a general practitioner until the appellant had been fully rehabilitated. Ms Van Wyk noted that the appellant had undertaken casual work as a cleaner at British Tobacco and generated income as a street vendor, selling hot food. After the accident, she did not go back to cleaning but continued with selling. Ms Van Wyk opined that although the appellant’s injuries were not severe, she would require time to heal before getting back to her pre-accident physical abilities. Ms Kotze confirmed in her report the appellant’s earnings as a cleaner by speaking to one Ms Grobler at British Tobacco. She noted that the monthly income of R2,500 for two to three days a week matched what is generally offered for casual cleaners. In terms of street vending, the appellant stated that she drew income of R4,000 monthly. The figure of R6,500 was thus used as basis for calculating the appellant’s loss of earning.


Findings: The trial court exercises a discretion and attempts to achieve the best estimate of a plaintiff’s loss. The appellant had provided actuarial calculations by way of a report prepared by J Sauer. The computation had resulted in the amount of R794,554. The court misdirected itself in abjuring the expert reports placed before it. Those reports made it plain that the appellant had suffered injuries that required various interventions, before she could regain her pre-accident physical abilities, albeit she had not sustained any fractures or dislocations. The court chose not to refer to the expert reports. Since the trial court had misdirected itself in refusing to make an award, and thus exercising no discretion at all, this court was at large to make its own award, taking into account the actuarial calculations. Having considered the circumstances of this case, the actuarial calculations provided two scenarios. A 10% spread applied on average which is R562,519 would be reasonable and fair. 


Order: The appeal succeeds with costs calculated at Scale C. The order of the court a quo is set aside and is replaced. The respondent is ordered to pay the appellant the amount of R557,165.80 in respect of loss of earnings. The respondent is ordered to provide the appellant with an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a).

BALOYI-MBEMBELE AJ (BAM J and MNISI AJ concurring)

ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Collateral information – Insufficient and unreliable – Claimed weekly income not supported by bank statements provided – Circumstances surrounding sale of taxi questioned – Absence of spreadsheet or any other financial record detailing income generated from taxi – Failed to prove claimed income on balance of probabilities – Explanations for lack of documentation found to be unconvincing – Absolution granted in respect of claim for past and future loss of income.

Facts: The plaintiff, Mvuselelo, sued the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for damages resulting from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident in 2019, allegedly caused by the negligent driving of an insured driver. The plaintiff claimed he owned and operated two taxis before the accident, earning between R9,000 and R17,000 per week from one. He asserted that due to his injuries (head, neck and right arm), he could no longer drive, leading to lost income and a diminished earning capacity. He initially claimed R9,900,000 in total damages, including amounts for future medical treatment, past and future loss of earnings, and general damages. The RAF disputed the seriousness of the injuries, a matter referred to the Health Professions Council of South Africa. The court separated the issues of merits and quantum, with the present focus on loss of earnings. The plaintiff submitted expert reports, including actuarial calculations based on his claimed income, and collateral evidence like bank statements and taxi association membership.


Application: The plaintiff applied for default judgment against the RAF for past and future loss of income, relying on expert reports and the limited collateral evidence provided. He argued that his informal employment circumstances justified a higher-than-normal contingency deduction due to the difficulty in proving his exact income.


Issue: The central issue was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proven his loss of earnings and, if so, the appropriate amount of compensation. A key sub-issue was the admissibility and weight of the collateral evidence presented to support his claimed income, considering his informal employment.


Discussion: The legal principles governing loss of earnings claims were reviewed, with emphasis on the need for logical assessment and compensation for patrimonial loss. The plaintiff's onus to prove his income on a balance of probabilities was highlighted. The plaintiff's testimony, expert reports (orthopedic surgeon, neurosurgeon, occupational therapist, plastic surgeon, psychologist, industrial psychologist, and actuary), and the collateral evidence (bank statements, taxi association letter, license disc photo) were analysed. Significant concerns were expressed about the reliability of the plaintiff's income claims, noting discrepancies in his testimony and the information provided to experts. The collateral evidence was found insufficient to substantiate the claimed earnings, particularly the lack of documentation regarding the sale of one taxi and the absence of a detailed income spreadsheet. The veracity of the taxi sale itself was questioned due to conflicting accounts. The plaintiff's arguments for applying a higher-than-normal contingency due to his informal employment and lack of record-keeping were considered. The difficulty in quantifying loss of earnings in such cases were also discussed, as highlighted in case law.


Findings: The plaintiff failed to prove his claimed income on a balance of probabilities. The collateral evidence was deemed insufficient and unreliable, particularly concerning the sale of the taxi and the claimed earnings. The credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his income and the circumstances surrounding the sale of his taxi were questioned. The plaintiff's claimed weekly income of R9,000 to R17,000 was not supported by the bank statements provided. While the statements showed deposits, they did not clearly reflect income specifically from the taxi business, nor did they reconcile with the claimed weekly earnings. The recurring deduction of R10,000 per month was unexplained and cast further doubt on the claimed income. The absence of a spreadsheet or any other financial record detailing the income generated from the taxi was noted, which was considered crucial evidence. The plaintiff’s failure to provide this, despite being given the opportunity, weakened his case. The plaintiff’s proposal for a higher-than-normal contingency was rejected, as this would amount to speculation and not proof on a balance of probabilities. The plaintiff’s explanations for the lack of documentation were found to be unconvincing.


Order: The defendant was ordered to pay 100% of the plaintiff’s proven damages. The defendant shall furnish the plaintiff with an undertaking for future medical expenses in terms of section 17(4)(a) of Act 56 of 1996. The claim for general damages is postponed indefinitely. Absolution from the instance is granted in respect of the claim for past and future loss of earnings.

LULEKA J

ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Brain injury – Conclusions on existence of cognitive deficits – Based on mere say-so of plaintiff and mother that difficulties were not present when accident occurred – Not persuasive on evidence that plaintiff suffered traumatic brain injury – Unpersuasive that deficits and impairments was result of an accident-related injury – Plaintiff was not unemployable but had diminished earning capacity due to injuries – Directed to obtain updated actuarial calculation.

Facts: The plaintiff, Yantolo, represented by her curatrix ad litem, Adv Y Isaacs NO, sued the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on 6 January 2019. The plaintiff, then 21 years old, was struck by an unidentified vehicle while walking on a pavement. She sustained pelvic fractures, a sciatic nerve injury and other injuries. The RAF conceded 90% liability for proven damages and agreed to pay general damages for the pelvic and sciatic nerve injuries. Expert reports were submitted, but the defendant did not provide any countervailing expert evidence.


Application: The plaintiff claimed past and future loss of earnings, general damages and future medical expenses. The plaintiff applied for expert evidence to be admitted via affidavit under Uniform Rule 38(2), which was granted. The defendant did not oppose this application but disputed some facts and opinions in the plaintiff’s expert reports. The court was constrained to accept the plaintiff’s expert evidence in the absence of countervailing evidence. The main issues were whether the plaintiff was employable post-accident, what her future injured earnings would be, and what deduction for contingencies should be applied. Additionally, the court had to determine a fair and reasonable award for general damages.


Discussion: The plaintiff’s injuries were examined, including pelvic fractures and sciatic nerve damage, which caused chronic pain and physical limitations. The plaintiff’s experts argued that she was unemployable due to her injuries, while the defendant contended that she was not unemployable and that her loss was of earning capacity rather than earnings. There were inconsistencies found in the plaintiff’s account of her employment history and schooling, which cast doubt on her claim that she was unemployable due to the accident. The experts’ conclusion that the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury were rejected, as the evidence was insufficient to prove this. It was accepted that the plaintiff had physical limitations, but it was found that she was not entirely unemployable. There was no investigation into her scholastic performance. While the experts’ reports discuss the complaints and difficulties experienced by the plaintiff since the accident, there was no investigation into the plaintiff’s cognitive functioning prior to the accident. The reports were devoid of any information on the plaintiff’s pre-accident condition.


Findings: None of the experts explored the possibility that the plaintiff abandoned her schooling due to cognitive deficits which existed prior to the accident. The conclusions on the existence of cognitive deficits were based on the mere say-so of the plaintiff and her mother that the difficulties she presents with were not present when the accident occurred. Though it was accepted that the plaintiff suffers from headaches, experiences blurred vision and nosebleeds, is forgetful and her concentration and attention abilities are impaired, it was not persuasive on the evidence that the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury. Nor was it persuasive that the deficits and impairments were the result of an accident-related injury. The plaintiff was not unemployable but had diminished earning capacity due to her injuries. A 50% deduction for contingencies on future injured earnings was deemed appropriate. The court awarded general damages of R800,000, considering the plaintiff’s chronic pain, pelvic deformity, and other sequelae. The court also ordered the protection of the plaintiff’s funds.


Order: The defendant is liable to pay 90% of the plaintiff’s proven damages. The plaintiff is directed to obtain an updated actuarial calculation of the plaintiff’s loss of earnings catering for the following deductions for contingencies: Uninjured past earnings: 10%; Uninjured future earnings: 15%; Injured future earnings: 50%. General damages are awarded in the amount of R800,000.

HASSIM J

22 January 2025

LESO AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – PRASA – Liability – Contributory negligence – Full train with open doors – Foreseeable risk of harm – Had opportunity to move to other coaches or look for a safe space to occupy – Failure to secure train doors was a breach of duty of care owed to plaintiff – Breach directly caused plaintiff's injury – Plaintiff contributorily negligent for standing near open door on an overcrowded train – Plaintiff 40% at fault and can recover 60% of his damages.

Facts: The plaintiff, Rathihaya, claims damages of R1,550,000 from the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) for injuries sustained on 29 August 2015. He was a fare-paying passenger on a Metrorail train traveling from Bosman Station to Saulsville Station in Gauteng. The plaintiff alleges that he was pushed out of the train due to the doors remaining open while the train was in motion, resulting in head injuries and scarring. He argues that PRASA was negligent for failing to close the doors and provide adequate security. PRASA denies liability, claiming the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for boarding an overcrowded train and standing near an open door.


Issue: The court must determine whether PRASA’s failure to close the train doors caused the plaintiff’s injuries or if the plaintiff’s actions (e.g., standing near the open door) were the primary cause of the incident.


Discussion: The plaintiff must prove that PRASA’s negligence directly caused his injuries. This involves establishing that PRASA breached its duty of care by failing to close the train doors, which created a foreseeable risk of harm. PRASA argued that the plaintiff’s decision to stand near the open door on an overcrowded train constituted contributory negligence. The court analyzed the evidence, including the plaintiff’s testimony and PRASA’s admission that the doors were open while the train was in motion. The train is made of several carriages, and a passenger can manoeuvre from one carriage to the other even when the train is moving. The plaintiff boarded a train that was full and stood next to the open door the whole trip when he had an opportunity to move to the other coaches or look for a safe space to occupy. The court found that PRASA breached its duty of care but also concluded that the plaintiff’s actions contributed to the accident.


Findings: The court found PRASA 60% liable for the plaintiff’s injuries due to its failure to close the train doors, which was a breach of its duty of care. The defendant was negligent and such negligence did contribute to the plaintiff’s being pushed out of the train. The plaintiff is also guilty of contributory negligence and the damages suffered by the plaintiff was reduced proportionate to the degree of his negligence. The plaintiff was found 40% contributorily negligent for standing near the open door on an overcrowded train, thereby assuming some risk. The plaintiff is entitled to recover 60% of the proven damages.


Order: PRASA is 60% liable for the plaintiff’s damages. The issue of quantum is postponed indefinitely. Costs are reserved for future determination.

1 November 2024

VALLARO AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – Unlawful arrest and detention – Dangerous weapon – Shard of glass wrapped in tape – Allegedly passed to plaintiff’s son – Evidence of defendants' witnesses found inconsistent and unreliable – Arresting officer did not personally witness alleged crime – Arrest and detention unlawful – Failed to provide evidence justifying plaintiff’s detention after first court appearance – R575,000 total compensation – Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013, s 3.

Facts: Coetzee sued the Minister of Police and the National Prosecuting Authority for unlawful arrest, detention (pre- and post-court appearance), and malicious prosecution. Coetzee was arrested without a warrant at the Johannesburg Magistrates Court for possession of a dangerous weapon, specifically a shard of glass wrapped in tape, which was allegedly passed to his son, who was in court for his own trial. He was detained at a police station and then a prison until his release.


Issue: The key issues were whether the arrest and detention were lawful, whether the plaintiff had proven malicious prosecution, and the appropriate quantum of damages for the unlawful arrest and detention.


Discussion: The evidence presented by both sides was analysed. The defendants argued the arrest was lawful under section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as the offense was committed in the presence of a peace officer. However, the arresting officer must have firsthand knowledge of the offense, not just a suspicion or information from others. The evidence of the defendants' witnesses, particularly regarding the alleged passing of the object and the signing of the rights document, was found to be inconsistent and unreliable. The requirements for lawful possession of a dangerous weapon and the duty of police officers when making an arrest were also discussed. The court considered the lawfulness of the detention after the first appearance, focusing on whether the police actions were the cause of the continued detention.


Findings: The arrest was unlawful because the arresting officer, Warrant Officer Molapo, did not personally witness the alleged crime, a requirement under section 40(1)(a) of the CPA. The arrest for possession of a dangerous weapon was also unjustified, as the weapon was found on the plaintiff’s son, not the plaintiff. The detention following the unlawful arrest was also unlawful. The defendants failed to provide evidence justifying the plaintiff’s detention after his first court appearance, and the conditions of detention were found to be degrading and inhumane. However, the court dismissed the claim for malicious prosecution, as the plaintiff failed to prove malice or lack of reasonable cause.


Order: The first defendant (Minister of Police) was ordered to pay the plaintiff R125,000 for the initial unlawful detention. The first and second defendants (Minister of Police and National Prosecuting Authority) were jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff R450,000 for the further unlawful detention.

30 January 2025

PARKER AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – Slip and trip – General damages – Lower back pain – Disc degeneration at L4/5 – Spinal fusion procedure necessary – Plaintiff’s hesitance to have undergone procedures – Actuarial calculations adjusted – Past medical expenses proven with vouchers – Pain and reduced mobility – Frustration with condition and impact on life – R300,000 – Also future medical expenses of R292,205 – Past medical of R24,779.77 – Before 50% apportionment.

Facts: Kleyn slipped and fell on a wet floor/stairs at KFC Somerset West, sustaining a soft tissue injury to her lower back. This injury resulted in disc degeneration at the L4/5 level, causing her ongoing pain and discomfort. Kleyn initially received conservative treatment, but her condition worsened, leading to pins and needles in her feet and increased back pain. She consulted a general practitioner, and further investigations revealed the narrowing of the L4 disc space. Kleyn, a 36-year-old security officer with an active lifestyle before the accident, experienced limitations in her mobility, impacting her ability to sit, walk, and stand for extended periods. She delayed a recommended spinal fusion procedure due to her personal circumstances and advice from her physician but eventually decided to undergo the surgery. The case proceeded to court to determine the quantum of damages after the court had previously found KFC liable for 50% of Kleyn's proven damages.


Issue: The issue before the court was to determine the appropriate amount of damages to compensate Kleyn for her injuries, including past and future medical expenses, and general damages for pain and suffering. Kleyn claimed for past medical expenses (R24,779.77), future medical expenses (R338,777), and general damages (R350,000).


Discussion: Kleyn presented expert testimony from Dr. Olivier, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed her with a significant soft tissue injury leading to mechanical backache and symptomatic disc degeneration. Dr. Olivier recommended that one spinal fusion procedure was necessary. He estimated a 60% probability that Kleyn would undergo the surgery. An actuary, Barnard, calculated the costs of these procedures based on Dr. Olivier's updated report. The judge considered the evidence regarding the likelihood of future procedures, Kleyn's pain, limitations, and the impact on her life. They also compared Kleyn's case to similar cases presented to determine an appropriate award for general damages, acknowledging that none were perfectly analogous. The judge adjusted the actuarial calculations, taking into account the plaintiff's past reluctance to undergo procedures and the updated medical opinion. The judge also considered the fact that some of the initial conservative treatment costs were already covered by her medical aid.


Findings: The court accepted Dr. Olivier's updated assessment that Kleyn would likely require one spinal fusion procedure and adjusted the actuarial calculations accordingly, reducing the future medical expense claim to R338,777. They also made a 10% contingency deduction, down from Dr. Olivier's 60% probability, based on Kleyn's past hesitancy, resulting in a future medical expense award of R292,205. Past medical expenses of R24,779.77 were proven with vouchers. The court found that R300,000 was an appropriate amount for general damages, considering Kleyn's pain, reduced mobility, frustration with her condition, and the impact on her life, comparing her situation to the cited case law. The judge specifically noted the chronic pain experienced by the plaintiff in RAF v Maasdorp as a relevant factor. The judge also disallowed the amount of R30,293 for initial conservative treatment as these costs were already covered by medical aid.


Award: The court ordered KFC to pay Kleyn R308,492.38, representing 50% of her total damages after apportionment. This amount comprised R24,779.77 for past medical expenses, R292,205.00 for future medical expenses, and R300,000 for general damages. KFC was also ordered to pay Kleyn's legal costs on a party and party basis on scale B, including the costs of her expert witnesses, Dr. Olivier and Michelle Barnard. Interest a tempore morae at 10.25% was also granted. The payment was ordered to be made into the trust account of Kleyn’s attorneys.

9 January 2025

WESSELS AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – Unlawful arrest and detention – Quantum – Detained for three days – Appellant's claim of sodomization was not pleaded in initial claim – Only mentioned in testimony – Lack of corroborating evidence for sodomization – Loss of vehicle not proven to be a direct result of detention – Not considered in assessment of damages – Difficult conditions of detention and unlawful nature of arrest – Initial award was inadequate – Appeal upheld – R90,000.

Facts: The appellant appealed a magistrate court's award of R45,000 for unlawful arrest and detention against the Minister of Police. The appellant was arrested without a warrant for alleged illegal hunting and detained for three days. He claimed he was sodomized by another inmate, threatened, and held in unsanitary conditions without basic amenities. He also claimed to have lost his vehicle as a result of the arrest.


Issue: The appeal focused solely on the quantum of damages, as the unlawfulness of the arrest was conceded. The court had to determine a fair and reasonable amount of compensation for the unlawful arrest and detention, considering the circumstances.


Discussion: The principles governing the assessment of damages for unlawful arrest and detention were discussed, with emphasis that the goal is not to enrich the aggrieved party but to provide solatium for injured feelings. There was a consideration of factors like the circumstances of the arrest, the conditions of detention, the impact on the individual, and comparable case law. Crucially, the appellant's claim of sodomization was addressed, it being noted that it was not pleaded in his initial claim and was only mentioned cursorily in his testimony. The importance of proper pleading and the potential prejudice to the respondent when unleaded facts are introduced were emphasized. The lack of corroborating evidence for the sodomization and the alleged loss of the vehicle was further noted.


Findings: The appellant's claim of sodomization, due to the lack of proper pleading and corroborating evidence, could not be considered in the assessment of damages. Similarly, the claimed loss of the vehicle was not proven to be a direct result of the detention. The appellant's difficult conditions of detention and the unlawful nature of the arrest were acknowledged. Considering comparable cases and the principles of fair compensation, the initial award of R45,000 was inadequate.


Order: The appeal was upheld. The magistrate court's order was set aside and replaced with an order that the Minister of Police pay R90,000 in damages, with interest, and cover his legal costs in both the magistrate court and the appeal.

4 February 2025

NUKU J

RAF – Past medical expenses – Health insurance – Disputed liability for medical expenses – Arguing they were covered by deceased's medical aid – Plaintiff cited principle of res inter alios acta – RAF did not present any evidence or arguments based on reasonableness to justify departing from principle – Payment was a matter between deceased and his medical aid – RAF's poorly pleaded and unmeritorious defence – R935,477.28 for past loss of earnings – R115,436.14 for past medical expenses.

Facts: The late Mr Esack was injured in a motor vehicle collision and subsequently claimed damages from the Road Accident Fund (RAF). He passed away on May 4, 2020, before the case was finalized, and his executrix and spouse, Ms Esack, was substituted as the plaintiff. The RAF's liability was determined separately, leaving only the quantum of damages in dispute. Prior to the hearing, most heads of damages were settled, except for past hospital, medical and related expenses, the date from which interest would accrue, and costs. The RAF disputed liability for the medical expenses, arguing they were covered by the deceased's medical aid (Discovery Health), a fact not previously pleaded. The parties agreed on the amount of these expenses (R115,436.14) and stipulated that Discovery Health had paid them. They further stipulated, for the purposes of this case only, that these expenses constituted prescribed minimum benefits (PMBs) or treatment for emergency medical conditions (EMCs) for which Discovery was statutorily obliged to pay.


Issue: The central issue was whether the RAF was liable to compensate the plaintiff for past medical expenses paid by the deceased's medical aid, given the RAF's contention that the deceased suffered no loss as a result of the medical aid's payment, especially in light of the Discovery Health judgment. Related issues were the date from which interest on the awarded amounts should run and the appropriate scale of costs.


Discussion: The RAF argued that it should not be liable for the medical expenses because they were paid by Discovery Health, relying on Discovery Health (Pty) Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2024] ZAGPPHC 1303. The plaintiff argued that the payment was a private matter between the deceased and his medical aid and cited the principle of res inter alios acta. The Discovery Health judgment was analysed, noting that it did not definitively decide the deductibility of medical aid benefits, particularly PMBs and EMCs, and that it raised considerations without answering the question. The stare decisis doctrine and the Bane decision, which supported the plaintiff's position, were discussed. It was emphasized that the RAF did not present any evidence or arguments based on public policy, fairness, equity, or reasonableness to justify departing from the principle of res inter alios acta. The provisions of section 17(3) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 regarding interest were discussed, and arguments for the scale of costs were considered.


Findings: It was found that the Discovery Health judgment did not change the legal landscape regarding the res inter alios acta principle. It was held that the RAF was liable to compensate the plaintiff for the past medical expenses, as the payment was a matter between the deceased and his medical aid. It was determined that interest on the awarded amounts would run from 14 days after the date of the order, in accordance with section 17(3) of the Act. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, on a party-party scale until January 27, 2025 (when most issues were settled), and on an attorney-client scale for costs incurred after that date due to the RAF's pursuit of a poorly pleaded and ultimately unmeritorious defence.


Order: The RAF was ordered to pay the plaintiff R935,477.28 for past loss of earnings and R115,436.14 for past medical expenses. These amounts were to be paid within 180 days of the order. Interest on the capital amounts was to run from 14 days after the order, and interest on costs from 14 days after settlement or taxation. Execution on the capital and costs was stayed for 180 days. The existence of a contingency fee agreement between the plaintiff and her attorneys was noted.


* See also Machi v Road Accident Fund [2025] ZAGPJHC 78 at paras [89]-[100].

3 February 2025

VUMA AJ

RAF – General damages – Spine, arm and head injuries – Whether to grant plaintiff’s application to amend quantum of general damages – Defendant would not suffer prejudice – Defendant’s in limine objections dismissed – Failure to act on objections earlier – Plaintiff’s injuries and sequelae were severe and warranted compensation – Permanent unemployability – Requested amount was excessive – R850,000 for general damages – Costs order justified against defendant.

Facts: The plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle accident on 16 July 2009 in Johannesburg. She sustained multiple injuries, including a fractured right radius and ulna, soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine, and a mild concussive head injury. The defendant, the Road Accident Fund (RAF), conceded liability, and the only issue for determination was the quantum of general damages. The plaintiff initially claimed R700,000 for general damages but sought to amend this to R1,600,000 on the day of the trial. The defendant opposed the amendment and raised in limine issues, arguing that a previous court’s declaratory order regarding the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries was ultra vires and that the matter should be referred back to the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s objections were mala fide and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.


Issue: The primary issue was the quantum of general damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. Additionally, whether to grant the plaintiff’s application to amend the quantum of general damages from R700,000 to R1,600,000 and whether the defendant’s in limine objections were valid.


Discussion: The defendant’s in limine objections were dismissed as they were found to be a waste of time, particularly given the age of the previous court’s declaratory order and the defendant’s failure to act on its objections earlier. The plaintiff’s application to amend the quantum of general damages was granted, it being found that the defendant would not suffer prejudice, especially since no offer had been made by the defendant. The expert reports detailing the plaintiff’s injuries and their sequelae were considered, including chronic pain, psychological trauma, and loss of amenities. The plaintiff’s experts testified to the severe impact of the injuries on her life, including multiple suicide attempts, emotional disturbances, and permanent unemployability. The plaintiff’s case was compared to previous awards in similar cases to determine a fair and reasonable amount for general damages.


Findings: The plaintiff’s injuries and their sequelae were found to be severe and warranted compensation. However, the plaintiff’s requested amount of R1,600,000 was excessive. Instead, the court awarded R850,000 for general damages, considering the plaintiff’s injuries, the impact on her life, and comparable case law. Costs were awarded on a party-and-party scale, as the defendant’s conduct, including its failure to make an offer and its frivolous objections, justified a costs order in favour of the plaintiff.


Order: The plaintiff’s application to amend the quantum of general damages from R700,000 to R1,600,000 was granted. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff R850,000 for general damages. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including the costs of the curator ad litem, on a party-and-party scale. The defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiff’s application for a postponement on an attorney-and-client scale.

21 January 2025

DAVIS J

RAF – General damages – Acceptance by Fund – Offer of settlement – Whether deemed an acceptance of seriousness of plaintiff’s injuries – RAF is statutorily prohibited from offering general damages unless it is satisfied that injuries meet required threshold – Offer for general damages implies RAF’s acceptance of injuries as serious – Offers admissible as evidence of RAF’s acceptance – Jurisdictional requirement satisfied – General damages award R1,100,000.

Facts: The plaintiff, Masemola, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 13 February 2021 while driving on Moloto Road. He sustained severe injuries, including compression fractures of his T12-L1 vertebrae, resulting in temporary paraplegia. After surgery and rehabilitation, he regained mobility but now walks with a walking stick. The plaintiff, a 30-year-old petrol attendant at the time of the accident, lost his job in August 2023 due to his injuries. He filed a claim against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for general damages (non-pecuniary) and loss of earnings. The RAF made two settlement offers, including an amount for general damages, but the plaintiff did not accept them. The matter proceeded to court, with the RAF failing to appear or present evidence.


Issue: The central issue was whether the RAF’s offer to pay general damages constituted an acceptance that the plaintiff’s injuries were serious, as required by section 17(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, thereby entitling the plaintiff to claim general damages even if the offer was not accepted.


Discussion: The question of whether the RAF’s settlement offers, which included amounts for general damages, could be deemed an acceptance of the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries was examined. Previous cases were referenced, including Mertz v RAF [2022] ZAGPPHC 961 and Chetty v RAF [2021] ZAGPPHC 848, where it was held that an offer for general damages implies the RAF’s acceptance of the injuries as serious. The argument that the offers were merely attempts to settle the case without admitting liability was rejected, with emphasis that the RAF is statutorily prohibited from offering general damages unless it is satisfied that the injuries meet the required threshold. The “without prejudice” nature of the offers was also addressed, with the conclusion that the offers were admissible as evidence of the RAF’s acceptance of the seriousness of the injuries, even though the amounts offered remained privileged.


Findings: The RAF’s offers for general damages demonstrated its acceptance that the plaintiff’s injuries were serious, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement under section 17(1) of the RAF Act. On the merits, it was found that the plaintiff was not negligent and that the RAF was 100% liable for the damages. The plaintiff no longer suffered from paraplegia and was not bed-ridden or wheelchair-bound. His case was distinguished from those where plaintiffs suffered higher degrees of immobility with accompanying bedsores and other impairments. The plaintiff was awarded R1,100,000 for general damages and R3,377,433 for loss of earnings, totalling R4,477,433. The RAF was also ordered to provide an undertaking for future medical expenses and to pay the plaintiff’s legal costs.


Order: The RAF is ordered to pay the plaintiff R4,477,433, comprising R1,100,000 for general damages and R3,377,433 for loss of earnings. The RAF must provide an undertaking for future medical expenses under section 17(4)(a) of the RAF Act.

 

BOOKS / RESEARCH / ARTICLES

Author:  Caesar Balona


Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have spurred interest in their potential applications across various fields, including actuarial work. This paper introduces the use of LLMs in actuarial and insurance-related tasks, both as direct contributors to actuarial modelling and as workflow assistants. It provides an overview of LLM concepts and their potential applications in actuarial science and insurance, examining specific areas where LLMs can be beneficial, including a detailed assessment of the claims process. Additionally, a decision framework for determining the suitability of LLMs for specific tasks is presented. Case studies with accompanying code showcase the potential of LLMs to enhance actuarial work. Overall, the results suggest that LLMs can be valuable tools for actuarial tasks involving natural language processing or structuring unstructured data and as workflow and coding assistants. However, their use in actuarial work also presents challenges, particularly regarding professionalism and ethics, for which high-level guidance is provided.

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